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Abstract
Pooled forecasts frequently outperform individual forecasts of economic time series. This
paper shows that the introduction of model uncertainty into the formation of expectations can
account for the regularity. We conjecture that agents learn in a Bayesian way, using an
optimally designed combination of forecasts to form expectations. When these expectations
alter the ex-post realization of the data generating mechanism the pooled forecast may
dominate the best individual device.
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1. Introduction 
  It is well known that pooled forecasts frequently outperform individual forecasts of 
economic time series ex-post, in the sense that the pooled forecast of alternative models 
provides a smaller mean-squared forecast error (MSFE) than any of the individual models’ 
MSFEs
1. Bernanke and Boivin (2003), for example, show that pooled forecasts of inflation 
and  unemployment  do  as  well  or  better  than  the  Federal  Reserve’s  Greenbook  at  all 
horizons.  Although  several  explanations  have  been  proposed  (see,  e.g.,  Hendry  and 
Clements (2002)), the reason for this regularity is still an open question. We provide a new 
explanation for this phenomenon.   
  Our point of departure is to relax the standard assumption that economic agents 
know the true data generating process of the economic variable. We conjecture that agents 
face model uncertainty and learn in a Bayesian way, using a combination of forecasts to 
form expectations. In particular, they deal with model uncertainty by practicing Bayesian-
Model-Averaging (BMA) across a set of alternative models.  Developed by Leamer (1978), 
BMA has found a range of applications in the economics literature
2.  In these applications it 
is the econometrician who faces model uncertainty, while the agents in the economy know 
the  true  model
3.  Our  innovation  is  to  assume  that  the  agents  themselves  face  model 
uncertainty, and resolve the problem as a Bayesian econometrician would.  
  Min  and  Zellner  (1993)  show  that  ex-ante  forecasts  pooled  in  a  BMA  fashion 
provide a lower expected squared error loss that any individual model when the forecaster 
faces model uncertainty. Intuitively, for an agent that is uncertain about the true model of 
the economy, selecting a forecast combination provides insurance against large forecast 
errors. However, this does not explain why pooled forecasts should do so well ex-post, i.e., 
once the state of the economy is uncovered.  
  With  our  novel  way  of  modeling  expectations  it  is  simple  to  see  why  pooled 
forecasts  perform  so  well  (ex-post):  If  agents  form  their  expectations  with  BMA,  their 
forecasts feed back endogenously to affect the equilibrium, altering the ex-post realization 
of the data generating mechanism.   
  Our method is closely related to that of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). They assume 
that  agents  consider  one,  possibly  misspecified,  model  and  form  forecasts  using  least 
squares  regressions.  Since  the  forecast  functions  affect  the  state  of  the  economy,  their 
approach,  like  ours,  is  self-referential.  However,  our  approach  has  two  distinctive 
characteristics. First, we incorporate into the agents’ forecasting problem uncertainty about 
                                                            
1 Bates and Granger (1969) pioneered this literature. Hendry and Clements (2003) provide an excellent 
theoretical examination on the current state of the literature on forecasts combination and its advantages over 
the use of single forecasts. See also Clemen (1989) for an annotated bibliography.   
 
2 Areas of application include monetary policy (Brock, Durlauf and West (2003, 2004), Cogley and Sargent 
(2005)), economic growth (Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel 
(2001)), Finance (Avramov (2002)), and forecasting of exchange rates (Wright (2003a)) and inflation (Wright 
(2003b)). 
 
3 Brock, Durlauf and West (2003, 2004) and Cogley and Sargent (2005) analyze model uncertainty using 
Bayesian methods from the perspective of a policy-maker.    2 
the structure of the economy, a feature that is present in most economic environments. For 
instance, our working example includes the stylized fact that the variables that enter a 
monetary  policy  rule  are  uncertain.  Second,  although  adaptive  expectations  might  be 
reasonable, the forecast functions of misspecified models are inherently arbitrary. Instead, 
the  advantage  of  using  BMA  is  that  it  is  the  ex  ante  optimal  way  of  forecasting  and, 
therefore, it renders consistent the existence of multiple models.   
2. Expectations formation with model uncertainty  
  A simple AD-AS model (Lucas, 1973; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 p.29) provides 
a convenient platform to depict expectations formation under model uncertainty
4. Suppose 
that the economy consists of the aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves  
1 ( ) t t t t t
t t t
y y p E p v
m p y
g - = + - +
= +
.               (1) 
The money supply rule is 
1 t t t m m X e h - = + +                 (2) 
t v   and  t e   are  unobserved  white  noise  shocks,  1 t t E p - denotes  the  expectation  of  t p  
conditional on information available at  1 t - , and  1 t X -  is an exogenous observable shock. 
The equilibrium price satisfies 
1 1 t t t t t p E p X m l d x - - = + + +              (3) 
where ( ) ( ) g m + - = 1 y m , ( ) g g l + = 1 , ( ) g h d + = 1 , and  ( ) ( ) 1 t t t x e n g = - + .  
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This will serve as a useful benchmark.
5 
                                                            
4 It should be noted, however, that our analysis encompasses a large class of models. For instance, most of the 
applications of econometric learning presented by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) can be readily extended to 
incorporate model uncertainty. 
 
5 A semantic note:  We are using the term “rational expectations” in the narrow, traditional sense where 
agents use all available information and know the correct model. However, the BMA forecast is, by the Min 
and Zellner Theorem (1993) the “rational” way of forming expectations when the model is not known (see 
Proposition 1 below). We only highlight the REE because (1) it will help develop the intuition for our results, 
and (2) in some circumstances (Section 5) the BMA forecast converges asymptotically to the rational 
expectations forecast.   3 
  Agents consider a set of  K  alternative models of the economy that differ in the 
exogenous shock postulated to drive the money supply rule. The reduced form of model i 
( ) 1,....., i K = is 
1, , . t i t i t i p X a x - = +                 (5) 
We assume that one of the models, model k, includes the actual exogenous shock in (2).  
  In  the  face  of  this  uncertainty  agents  form  expectations  using  Bayesian-Model-
Averaging.  First, agents assign a prior probability  ( ) K i M p i ,..., 1 , =  to each model. Then, 
they assign a prior distribution to the unknown parameters, given the model probability 
distributions  ( ) ai i p M .  Finally,  the  data  D  is  generated  given  the  previous  two 
distributions  ( , ) ai i p D M . Conditioning in the observed data yields for each model the 
posterior probabilities, which can be interpreted as the probability that the i
th model is the 
true model: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where ( ) ( , ) ( ) a a a =∫ i i i i i i p D M p D M p M d  is the marginal likelihood of the i
th model.  
The forecast of any model iis then  
, 1, ˆ .
e
t i i t i p X a - =                  (7) 











BMA t p p p                    (8) 
The point forecast is thus the forecast for each individual model weighted by its posterior 
probability distribution. 
  The use of BMA is not arbitrary, but is a natural procedure for optimizing agents 
facing  model  uncertainty.  Specifically,  Min  and  Zellner  (1993)  demonstrate  that  BMA 
provides the minimum expected square error
6. Therefore  
Proposition 1. If the forecaster seeks to minimize the expected square forecast error, where 
the expectations are taken over the model space, it is optimal to form expectations using 
BMA. 
                                                            
6 Madigan and Rafterty (1994) also show that BMA is better than any single forecast when forecast ability is 
measured by a logarithmic scoring rule.   4 
  Although we omit the proof, which is in Min and Zellner (1993), the intuition of the 
result is that, for an agent that is uncertain about the true model of the economy, selecting a 
forecast  combination  provides  insurance,  i.e.  she  can  never  be  “too  wrong”.  The 
proposition refers to ex ante forecasts. It is a normative assertion: agents should use a 
pooled forecast if they face model uncertainty.  
3. Equilibrium  
  We will show that BMA can provide the best forecasts not only ex ante, but also ex 
post. Why?  Unlike Min and Zellner (1993), the forecasters here do not operate outside the 
system.  The forecasts now feed back endogenously to affect the equilibrium price:  agents 
form their expectations based on (8), which in turn affects the actual price generated in 
accordance with  the  true  model.  As  in  the  literature  on  adaptive  expectations  (see  e.g. 
Evans and Honkapohja (2001)), the use of BMA by forecasters makes the data generating 
process endogenous, i.e. a self-referential system. 
  Consider the realized equilibrium price. Substituting the BMA forecast (8) into the 
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It follows that the forecast error for the BMA model is 





t t BMA i t i t t
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=
- = - + + ∑                   (10) 
To  develop  some  intuition  for  what  this  means,  it  is  useful  to  re-write  (10)  using  the 
equilibrium price of the Rational Expectations model [equation (4)] as a benchmark: 
( ) , , 1 ,
e
t t BMA RE BMA t p p B l x - = - +                                         (11) 
where , , ,
e e
RE BMA t RE t BMA B p p º -  is the bias of the BMA forecast relative to the REE forecast. 
Equation (11) says that the BMA forecast error is proportional to the average bias of all the 
models relative to the REE forecast. In other words, the BMA forecast error depends upon 
the bias in the equilibrium price (relative to REE) caused by the fact that agents use BMA 
forecasting. 
  Similarly, consider the forecast error of any model j  (including the REE model), 
, , , 1 ,
1
, ,                       .
K
e e e
t t j i j i t i t t t j
i
RE j RE BMA t
p p p X p
B B
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∑                                         (12) 
where , , ,
e e
RE j t RE t j B p p º -  is the bias of model j relative to the REE forecast.  Suppose that 
model j predicts a price higher than in the REE forecast, so that  , 0. RE j B <  Then Equation   5 
(12) tells us that the mean forecast error of model  j will be lower if the BMA forecast also 
forecasts a price in excess of the RE forecast.  In other words, the “intrinsic” error of model 
j can be offset if the use of BMA forecasting raises the actual equilibrium price, relative to 
the REE equilibrium. 
4. When does BMA do best ex post? 
  The mean-square forecast error of BMA is
7 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
, 1, , ,   1
e
t t BMA i t i BMA RE BMA E p p X i B x p f l s - - " º = - +                        (13) 
The mean-square forecast error of any model  j is 
( )
2 2 2 2 2
, 1, , , , , 2 . t j t j j RE j RE j RE BMA RE BMA E X B B B B x x f l l s - º = - + +                     (14) 
The BMA forecast does better than any single model if . j BMA f f <   When will this happen? 
In the appendix we show 
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To provide some intuition for this result we provide a graphical analysis of the case 
where  , 0 RE j B < and  1 2 l < , that is, when model j over-predicts the price relative to the 
REE and the weight attached to the BMA forecast in the equilibrium price is low.  
Figure 1 shows the mean-square forecast errors of BMA and model  j  as functions 
of the bias of the BMA forecast (relative to REE). First consider the mean square error of 
BMA,  . BMA f  It is an increasing function of the absolute value bias of the BMA forecast:  
the larger the bias of BMA relative to REE, the less accurate is the BMA forecast. 
Now  consider  the  mean  square  forecast  error  of  model j ,  . j f   Recall  that  the 
forecast  error  of  model  j depends  upon  both  its  “intrinsic”  bias  and  the  bias  in  the 
equilibrium induced by the use of BMA.  On the one hand, BMA forecasting reduces the 
accuracy of model  j by creating a bias in the equilibrium price, relative to REE [this is the 
2
, RE BMA B  term in (14)]. On the other hand, if BMA causes the equilibrium price to be high 
(relative to REE), then this may offset the “intrinsic” bias of model  j [this is the interaction 
                                                            
7 Note that, since the exogenous shocks 1, t i X -  are observable at the time when the forecast is made, the only 
stochastic term in the one-step-ahead forecast error is t x .    6 
term  , , 2 RE j RE BMA B B l   in  (14)].    For  sufficiently  low  BMA  bias,  the  latter  effect  will 
dominate the former, and BMA will do better than model  . j  
5. Example and Asymptotic behavior  
  We now present a simple case that provides more transparent results in terms of the 
classic  linear  regression  model  and  allows  us  to  study  convergence.  Specifically,  we 
assume  that  the  observable  exogenous  shocks  are  IID  and  uncorrelated  and  that  the 
representative agent holds diffuse prior beliefs on  i a  and diffuse priors on the model space. 
  Without  trying  to  contend  generality,  the  assumption  of  diffuse  priors  is  an 
interesting case since the Bayesian parameter estimates reduce to the classical ordinary 
least squares estimates and the BMA weights can be approximated by the fit of the least 
















  (see  e.g.  Rafterty,  1995).  We  believe  that  this  process,  which 
Doppelhofer,  Miller,  and  Sala-i-Martin  (2000)  call  Bayesian  averaging  of  classical 
estimates, gives more realism to our hypothesis that agents use BMA to form expectations.  
  Similar to the previous analysis, the DGP proceeds as follows: 
1.  Given an initial price, agents use least squares to form the forecast rules  , , 1 ˆ .
e
t i i i t p a X - =  
2.  Agents calculate the BMA weights for model i given the BIC adjusted likelihoods. 
3.  The equilibrium price is generated.  
4.  The observed actual price leads to a change in expectations and a change in the value of 
the parameters and the weights attached to each model, which in turn affects the price, 
and so on. 
  Let  , ˆi t a  be the least squares estimate using the prices observed up to period t and the 
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actual price is generated in accordance with (9), which now satisfies      
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.                           (17) 
This equation permits establishing the restrictions over the parameters of the models under 
which BMA does better than any model j (equations 15 and 16).  
  In addition, the following proposition establishes the asymptotic behavior of (17)   7 
Proposition  3.    Under  the  assumptions  above, 
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, 2 ˆ ˆ
i t
i p



















i k " ¹ ,  i.e. except for the model that includes the exogenous shock in the actual policy 
rule. For model k we have 
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, that is, the REE.  
Proof. see appendix. 
In  other  words,  the  BMA  forecast  converges  asymptotically  to  the  rational 
expectations  forecast.  The  intuition  of  this  result  is  that  the  model  that  includes  the 
exogenous shock in the actual policy rule will, on average, do better than the other models. 
This, in turn, implies that agents will tend to increase the BMA weights attached to this 
model over time. As they do so, the least squares estimates of the model that uses the 
exogenous shock in the monetary policy rule converge to the REE.    
6. Conclusion 
   Proposition 2 actually applies to any pooled forecast:  A pooled forecast could 
dominate  individual  forecasts  simply  because  forecasters  chose  to  use  it.  This  would 
explain why non-BMA pooled forecasts, such as numerical averages, also do better than 
individual forecasts. The advantage of focusing on BMA is that it is the ex ante optimal 
way of forecasting in the presence of model uncertainty. Further, BMA forecasting allows 
us to investigate the convergence properties of the self-referential system.    8 
Appendix   
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
First consider the mean-square forecast error of BMA as a function of k BMA B , : 




, 1 x s l f + - = BMA RE BMA RE BMA B B           (A.1) 
Plotting  BMA f  as a function of  BMA RE B , yields a parabola that reaches a minimum at 
2
x s . 
  Next consider the mean-square forecast error of model j: 
( ) ( ) .
2 2
, , , x s l f + - = BMA RE j RE BMA RE j B B B         (A.2) 
Note that 
    ( ) . 0 0
2 2
, > + = x s f j RE j B             (A.3) 
    ( ) RE BMA j RE j B B , ,
/ 2 l l f - - =             (A.4) 
    0 2
2 // > = l f j                (A.5) 
(A.2), (A.4) and (A.5) imply that  j f  reaches a minimum of 
2





B =  
  Finally, the mean-square forecast errors of the two models are equal when 




, j RE j RE BMA RE BMA RE B B B B - + - = l l       (A.6) 
The roots to this equation are  RE j B ,  and  ( ). 2 1 , l - - RE j B  This identifies four different 
constellations of parameter values, depending upon the signs of  j RE B ,  and  1 2l - , from 
which proposition 2 follows. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Our  argument  follows  Bray  and  Savin’s  (1986)  analysis  of  least  squares 
convergence to the REE.  
  Fix  , 1 ˆi t a - , and  i p . By the strong law of large numbers  ( )
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almost  surely  and  ( )
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  ∑ .  This  implies  , , 1 ˆ ˆ i t i i t a a lp - =     i "  
except  for  model  k.  If  we  now  allow  ˆi a   to  evolve  over  time,  and  since  1 i lp < ,  this 
estimates  converge  to  zero.  Furthermore,  since  the  coefficients  attached  to  any  model 
besides  the  RE  model  converge  to  zero, i BIC ,  and  as  a  result  the  BMA  weights,  also 
converge to zero 
Using a similar argument, for model k we have  , , 1 1 ˆ ˆ k t k t t a a X lp d - - = + . In the limit 







; but, since for this model  1 p =  we obtain the REE.   9 
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